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Abstract—End-to-end learning has recently emerged as a
promising technique to tackle the problem of autonomous driv-
ing. Existing works show that learning a navigation policy from
raw sensor data may reduce the system’s reliance on external
sensing systems, (e.g. GPS), and/or outperform traditional meth-
ods based on state estimation and planning. However, existing
end-to-end methods generally trade off performance for safety,
hindering their diffusion to real-life applications. For example,
when confronted with an input which is radically different from
the training data, end-to-end autonomous driving systems are
likely to fail, compromising the safety of the vehicle. To detect
such failure cases, this work proposes a general framework for
uncertainty estimation which enables a policy trained end-to-
end to predict not only action commands, but also a confidence
about its own predictions. In contrast to previous works, our
framework can be applied to any existing neural network and
task, without the need to change the network’s architecture or
loss, or to train the network. In order to do so, we generate
confidence levels by forward propagation of input and model
uncertainties using Bayesian inference. We test our framework
on the task of steering angle regression for an autonomous
car, and compare our approach to existing methods with both
qualitative and quantitative results on a real dataset. Finally, we
show an interesting by-product of our framework: robustness
against adversarial attacks.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
For supplementary video see: https://youtu.be/1JtU78Heceg.
The project’s code is available at: https://github.com/
mattiasegu/A General Framework for Uncertainty
Estimation in Deep Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
A current trend in autonomous driving consists of learning
navigation policies end-to-end from raw sensor data. Such ap-
proaches are typically categorized by the way they are trained:
(i) supervised learning [1]–[3] or (ii) reinforcement learn-
ing [4]. Despite their differences, both types of approaches
rely on the predictions of one or more neural networks which,
after training, are assumed to be accurate. Blindly trusting the
prediction of a neural network could have severe implications:
What if the current observation is very different from the
training ones? What if the networks’ inputs are corrupted
by noise? In safety-critical applications, e.g., autonomous
driving, such questions cannot be disregarded. To tackle these
problems, we propose to accompany every prediction of a
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▪ We derive a framework that recovers the total uncertainty for any
neural network architecture
Fig. 1. Uncertainty estimation is necessary to build a safe autonomous driving
system. Indeed, a system can be fully functional on a clean image (left), but
can return erroneous prediction when processing a corrupted input (right).
Uncertainty estimation provides an automatic detection mechanism of such
failure cases. The red slices represent one standard deviation from the mean
prediction.
neural network with an uncertainty measuring the network’s
confidence to its prediction.
Recent works have leveraged the idea of measuring uncer-
tainty to increase the safety of autonomous driving systems.
For example, Kahn et al. [4] propose a collision avoidance
system trained with reinforcement learning which uses un-
certainty predictions to minimize the risk of collision. More
recently, Lee et al. [2] propose to exploit an ensemble of redun-
dant neural networks trained on different sensors modalities,
trusting at test time the prediction with lowest uncertainty. In
addition, Feng et al. [3] show how object detection pipelines
may benefit from uncertainty estimates in a driving scenario.
All previous works deployed heuristics to generate uncer-
tainty estimates, which are generally problem specific and do
not necessarily generalize across tasks or datasets. To improve
the quality of uncertainty estimates, this work proposes to ap-
ply ideas borrowed by Bayesian inference [5] to deep learning
models. In particular, we propose to divide the uncertainty
into two distinct components: (i) Model uncertainty, which
derives from the uncertainty on network weights [6] and
represents a measure of the model’s confidence about a specific
sample, and (ii) Data uncertainty, which measures the impact
of input sensor’s noise on the output prediction. Generally,
model uncertainty increases for samples which are not well
represented in the training dataset, while data uncertainty is
independent of the training dataset and is generated by sensor
noise or adversarial attacks.
In our framework, we compute both types of uncertainty
by forward propagating both probability distribution over
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weights and input noise through a (possibly pre-trained) neural
network. This allows us to compute uncertainties without
changing the network’s architecture or loss, which is a feature
that classic approaches for uncertainty estimation lack of. We
test our framework on the task of end-to-end steering angle
estimation, and compare it on a quantitative and qualitative
basis with existing approaches for uncertainty estimation. In
doing so, we show that our approach can accurately estimate
uncertainties at no cost in term of performance. In addition, we
qualitatively demonstrate the robustness of our method against
adversarial attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
Due to the large number of parameters and the non-
linear activation functions, the true posterior distribution of a
neural network is intractable to compute. To approximate the
true posterior, existing methods deploy different techniques,
mainly based on variational inference, which we present in
the following sections.
A. Dropout to Estimate Model Uncertainty
To account for model uncertainty in deep learning, a distri-
bution is placed over neural network (NN) weights ω, defining
a Bayesian neural network [7]–[9]. The work of Gal et al. [10]
provides a mathematically grounded framework to capture
model uncertainty leveraging dropout at test-time [11]. Specif-
ically, they propose to approximate the intractable posterior
distribution over network weights p(ω|X,Y) given a specific
training set D = {X,Y} by collecting multiple predictions for
a single input, each with a different realization of weights due
to dropout. This method is often referred to as Monte Carlo
(MC) dropout.
Gal et al. show how the mean prediction over multiple MC
samples improves predictive precision and proposes to recover
the model uncertainty for prediction y given input x as:
Varq(y|x)
(
y
) ≈ σ2ID
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
ŷTt ŷt − Eq(y|x)(y)TEq(y|x)(y)
with {ŷ ≡ ŷ(x,Wt1, ...,WtL)}Tt=1 a set of T sampled outputs
for randomly masked weights Ŵti ∼ q(Wi) extracted from
the distribution of the i-th layer.
One of the main limitations of this work is that σ2, a
measure of the amount of noise in the data, is assumed to
be constant for any input. However, self-driving cars operate
in a variety of environmental conditions and are equipped with
sensors that are often sensitive to temperature and illumina-
tion conditions. Consequently, different input samples might
present different noise levels.
B. Learning Model and Data Uncertainty Together
A further step towards total uncertainty estimation was made
by Kendall et al. [12], that proposed a framework to jointly
estimate both data and model uncertainty under the assumption
of having input points with different noise levels than others.
Fig. 2. Assumed Density Filtering [13], [14] returns an estimate of both
the predictive mean and the data uncertainty by propagating input uncertainty
through the neural network.
The data uncertainty is learned by training the NN under the
heteroscedastic loss:
LNN(θ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
2σ2(xi)
||yi− f(xi)||2 + 1
2
log σ2(xi) (1)
where the input noise σ2 = σ2(xi) has been made input-
dependent, and f(xi) is the output of the NN with parameters θ
for input xi. By training a neural network with heteroscedastic
loss (Eq. 1) and by taking multiple forward samples applying
dropout at test-time as in Sec. II-A, the total variance is
recovered as:
Var(y) ≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
σˆ2t
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
ŷTt ŷt − Eq(y|x)(y)T Eq(y|x)(y)
with {yˆt, σˆ2t }Tt=1 a set of T sampled outputs for randomly
masked weights Ŵt ∼ q(W). However, this approach needs
to modify the network structure splitting its head into two parts
to learn data uncertainty. Also, this approach forces to re-train
under the heteroscedastic loss (Eq. 1) to retrieve an uncertainty
estimate, which often results in a performance drop.
C. Data Uncertainty Propagation with Assumed Density Fil-
tering
Sampling approaches are often too slow for practical sce-
narios. Gast et al. [15] introduced a lightweight approach
to recover uncertainty while maintaining the same network
architecture, with minor changes to propagate both mean and
variance of the input distribution. They propose to replace
every intermediate network activation by distributions, follow-
ing the work in [16] for non-linear Gaussian belief networks.
Moreover, the distribution is propagated through the network
in a single pass using Assumed Density Filtering (ADF) [13],
[14] (Fig. 2).
The main advantage of this approach is that it is possible to
assume a distribution over input data and propagate it through
the network to obtain an estimate of data uncertainty. On
the other hand, Gast et al. disregards the model uncertainty
contribution, under the assumption that it can be explained
away if large amount of data are available. However, in
autonomous driving, where out-of-distributions examples may
cause the model to return wrong predictions, disregarding
model uncertainty might have severe implications.
III. RECOVERING TOTAL UNCERTAINTY
A. Fusing MC Dropout and Assumed Density Filtering
Autonomous cars are equipped with an increasing number
of sensors, for which sensor variance is often known from the
data sheet. Having detailed knowledge of the input variance,
we suggest to recover data uncertainty by propagating uncer-
tainty on input points through the network, as in Section II-C.
We will now deploy a framework that can account for both
model and data uncertainty by propagating input mean and
variance with ADF network [15] and by taking MC samples
of the resulting output mean and variance.
The ADF network from Section II-C can be seen as a
probabilistic model p(y|z,ω)p(z|x), where x is the input
sample and z is the input perturbed by white gaussian noise:
p(z|x) ∼ N (z;x, σ2n) (2)
and σ2n is the variance of the n-th input pixel.
To take into account also weight uncertainty, the ADF
network is turned into a Bayesian Neural Network (BNN) by
placing a distribution over its weights as in II-A. After training
the standard NN with any desired loss, we convert it to its ADF
version. Model uncertainty is recovered by collecting multiple
stochastic forward samples with MC dropout applied on the
ADF network itself. The network will output both predictive
mean yˆ and data variance σˆ2data, thus the total predictive
uncertainty for prediction y given input x in this model can
be approximated as:
Var(y) ≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
σˆ2data,t (3)
+
1
T
T∑
t=1
ŷTt ŷt − Eq(y,z|x)(y)T Eq(y,z|x)(y)
with ŷt ≡ ŷt(x, ẑ1,t, ..., ẑL,t) and {ŷt, σˆ2data,t}Tt=1 a set of T
sampled outputs for randomly masked weights Ŵt ∼ q(W).
This result means that the data uncertainty retrieved with
uncertainty propagation and the model uncertainty obtained
by MC sampling can be directly summed to obtain the total
uncertainty. We will now show how Equation 3 can be derived.
B. Predictive Variance
Consider the probabilistic model of the ADF network and
the probabilistic distribution over the input:
p(y, z|x,ω) = p(y|z,ω)p(z|x)
p(z|x) ∼ N (z;x, σ2n) (4)
Let’s now place a posterior distribution p (ω|X,Y) over
network weights given the training data D = {X,Y}. Con-
sequently, the full posterior distribution of the Bayesian ADF
network can be parametrized as
p (y, z|x,X,Y) =
(∫
p(y|z,ω) · p(ω|X,Y)dω
)
· p(z|x)
=
∫
p(y, z|x,ω) · p(ω|X,Y)dω
(5)
where p(y, z|x,ω) = p(y|z,ω) · p(z|x) ∼ N (ŷω, σ2data,ωID)
for each model weights realization ω. Also, we approximate
the intractable posterior over network weights as
p(ω|X,Y) ≈ q(ω) = Bern(z1) · · ·Bern(zL) (6)
where Bern(zi) is a Bernoullian distribution over the activation
of the i-th layer. Thus,
p (y, z|x,X,Y) ≈
∫
p(y, z|x,ω) · q(ω)dω = q(y, z|x) (7)
We will now prove that our framework actually recovers
the total variance by plugging multiple stochastic forward
passes with MC dropout in Equation 3.
Proof:
Eq(y,z|x)
(
yTy
)
(1)
=
∫ ( ∫
yTy · p(y, z|x,ω)dy
)
q(ω)dω
(2)
=
∫ (
Covp(y,z|x,ω)(yω)
+ Ep(y,z|x,ω)(yω)TEp(y,z|x,ω)(yω)
)
· q(ω)dω
(3)
=
∫ (
Covp(y,z|x,ω)(yω) + Ep(y,z|x,ω)(yω)TEp(y,z|x,ω)(yω)
)
· Bern(z1) · · ·Bern(zL)dz1 · · · dzL
(4)
=
∫ (
σ2data,ωID + ŷ(x, z1, ..., zL)
T ŷ(x, z1, ..., zL)
)
· Bern(z1) · · ·Bern(zL)dz1 · · · dzL
(5)≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
σˆ2data,t +
1
T
T∑
t=1
ŷ(x, ẑ1,t, ..., ẑL,t)
T ŷ(x, ẑ1,t, ..., ẑL,t)
(1) follows by the definition of expected value.
(2) follows by the definition of covariance:
Cov(y) = E(yTy)− E(y)T E(y)
(3) follows from Equation 6.
(4) since p(y, z|x,ω) = N (y; ŷ(x, z1, ..., zL), σ2dataID).
(5) approximation by Monte Carlo integration.
Consequently, from the result just obtained and by the defini-
tion of variance, it can be easily shown that the total variance
can be computed as:
Mattia Segù – Robotics and Perception Group 19
Experiments – Steering Angle prediction
➢ We test our framework on a dropout version of DroNet
[Loquercio, RA-L 2018]
➢ We expanded an existing PyTorch library [Gast, CVPR 2018],
adding probabilistic 2D Dropout and Batch-Normalization layers
Dropout
Dropout
Fig. 3. Our dropout version of DroNet that leverages only the branch for
steering angle prediction.
Var(y) = Eq(y,z|x)
(
yTy
)− Eq(y,z|x)(y)T Eq(y,z|x)(y)
≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
ŷ(x, ẑ1,t, ..., ẑL,t)
T ŷ(x, ẑ1,t, ..., ẑL,t)
− Eq(y,z|x)(y)T Eq(y,z|x)(y) + 1
T
T∑
t=1
σˆ2data,t
which amounts to the sum of the sample variance of T MC
samples (model uncertainty) and the average of the corre-
sponding data variances σ2data,t returned by the ADF network.
The proof shows an important result: the data variance
obtained with ADF and the model variance obtained with
MC sampling applied on the ADF NN itself can indeed be
summed.
In contrast with the uncertainty recovered in II-A, here
the uncertainty has been made data-dependent. Moreover, we
propose a Bayesian framework that can retrieve both model
and data uncertainty without changing network loss and with
a negligible increase in the number of parameters. This means
that any existing network with weights trained according to
a specific criterion (e.g. MSE loss) can be easily adapted to
provide a total uncertainty estimate without time-consuming
re-training and avoiding to change loss, which may cause
precision loss. In conclusion, the final output of our framework
is [y∗, σ2total], where y
∗ is the mean of the mean predictions
{yˆt}Tt=1 collected over T stochastic forward passes. Data and
model variance are summed to obtain the total variance, as we
have shown to be correct in the proposed proof.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Our framework for uncertainty estimation is validated on
a dropout version (Fig. 3) of DroNet, a CNN trained for
steering angles prediction [1]. To take into account model
uncertainty, we place Dropout layers before every weight layer.
Also, DroNet was deployed to output both a prediction of
the steering angle and a collision probability. We remove
the branch for the collision probability evaluation and we
train the resulting CNN on the center camera images of
the publicly available Udacity dataset. This dataset presents
images taken from camera sensors mounted on a car under
different lightning and traffic conditions.
Fig. 4. Distribution of steering samples in training split of Udacity dataset.
We first train the non-Bayesian version of DroNet for the
task of regressing steering angles and we evaluate the RMSE
for its predictions. Afterwards, our framework is applied on
the NN to compute mean predictions and variance estimates.
Once we have collected uncertainty estimates, we need to
solve the problem of evaluating them. Given that there is
no ground-truth for uncertainty estimates of Neural Network
predictions, we propose both a quantitative evaluation of
our framework considering RMSE and log-likelihood, and a
qualitative evaluation performing adversarial attacks on our
model and showing that it is robust to adversarial noises in
the range for the assumed input variance.
A. The Importance of Model and Data Uncertainty
We will now show that in life-critical tasks such as au-
tonomous driving it is essential to take into account both model
and data uncertainty.
By looking at the distribution of steering angles in the train-
ing dataset (Fig. 4), we can notice that the most represented
samples are those with steering angles close to zero. Driving
on straight lines is indeed the most natural situation, thus
samples with higher steering angles are the least represented in
training set. Hence, the model will tend to overfit on the most
represented samples. Model uncertainty is in this case useful to
evaluate how much a model is certain about its predictions and
we expect our framework to return a high level of variance for
images taken while the car is steering, since these are the cases
on which the NN is trained the least. This can be seen from
Fig. 5, where it is important to highlight that the prediction
of our CNN is satisfactory for both images. Although the
prediction is remarkably precise also for the right image, the
model uncertainty is in this case much higher since the car
is steering, and this is one of the least represented samples
in the training data. Thus, we have just shown how model
uncertainty is essential in this regression task to discriminate
between images that are well-known from our model and other
cases about which the model is less instructed. Although data
uncertainty remains roughly constant for images where the
car is either steering or not, it is still important in this task,
because in some cases data uncertainty is higher than model
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Results – Importance of Model Uncertainty
➢ Comparison: low/high model uncertainty
▪ Model uncertainty changes the most for least represented samples
▪ Data uncertainty does not depend on training distribution
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 [𝑟𝑎𝑑2]
Steering Angle          =  0.00266
Model Uncertainty =  0.00025
Data    Uncertainty =  0.00034
Steering Angle          =  0.58217
Model Uncertainty =  0.19925
Data    Uncertainty =  0.00561
Lowest Variance Image Highest Variance Image
Fig. 5. Comparison between a case with low model uncertainty (left image)
and a case with high model uncertainty (right image). The red slices represent
one standard deviation from the mean prediction.
uncertainty (left image) and thus plays a fundamental role in
total uncertainty estimation.
B. Quantitative Evaluation
To assess our estimate quantitatively, we compare the scores
for log-likelihood and RMSE of our framework against other
approaches previously presented. We choose to validate these
methods comparing the average test log-likelihood on the
dataset D = {x,y}
l(yˆ,σ2tot;y) =
1
D
∑
i∈D
(
− 1
2
log(2pi)− 1
2
log(σ2tot,i)
− 1
2σ2tot,i
(yi − yˆi)2
)
since it is a measure of how well the target fits to the output
Gaussian distribution of our model.
Moreover, many cited methods to estimate uncertainty cause
a drop in precision. We show that our method is generally
better than others in terms of both RMSE and log-likelihood.
Method Uncertainty RMSE Avg Test ll
MC Dropout Model 0.088 0.7758
ADF Data 0.1571 -4.2504
Heteroscedastic Total 0.1144 1.1097
Ours Total 0.0987 1.0389
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN APPROACHES FREQUENTLY USED IN LITERATURE
AND OUR FRAMEWORK. (T=1000 for sampling approaches)
By looking at the log-likelihoods in Table I, it is possible
to notice that our method outperforms the baselines for un-
certainty estimation of MC Dropout and ADF, which consider
respectively only model uncertainty and data uncertainty. The
heteroscedastic NN combined with MC Dropout, as proposed
by Kendall [12], is instead slightly better than our approach in
terms of log-likelihood, since it is specifically trained to min-
imize the Negative Log-Likelihood of a Gaussian. However,
the heteroscedastic NN approach comes with some limitations:
the network needs to be re-trained under the heteroscedastic
loss (1), causing a loss in precision. In contrast, our method,
here tested with an assumed input noise of 10−3, reports a
lower RMSE than Kendall’s approach. This is justified by the
fact that our framework takes the standard NN trained on the
desired MSE loss and applies both ADF and MC Dropout
on it, without changing the weights of the NN. Furthermore,
our method is also more precise than ADF alone. Only MC
Dropout outperforms our approach in terms of RMSE, because
it leverages the non-Bayesian NN trained for this task and
collects multiple samples applying dropout at test time. The
reason why our framework cannot reach the same precision
as the standard neural network is that it loses precision in
non-linear layers, which present mean-variance interaction.
As a trade-off to this loss in precision, we will show that
our framework gains robustness to adversarial attacks [17].
C. Robustness to Adversarial Attacks
Our framework propagates input mean and variance through
the NN, recovering a distribution over the output prediction.
This distribution propagation is based on the assumption that
the input is corrupted by white Gaussian noise, with variance
σ2n, where σ
2
n is a parameter that can either be selected to
match the sensor noise reported on the sensor’s data sheet
or can be tuned to tackle adversarial attacks with adversarial
noise comparable to the assumed input noise. The latter claim
is confirmed by the results shown in Fig. 6. On the left are
shown results computed with the standard NN, onto which
MC Dropout is performed to recover a measurement of model
uncertainty. On the right, results from our framework using the
ADF NN are displayed. Concerning the top-left image pair, we
see that the realistic-looking adversarial image generated with
adversarial noise  = 0.01 is able to fool the neural network,
which indeed reports a high uncertainty level. On the other
side, by looking at the top-right image pair it is important to
highlight how our framework, with an assumed input noise
of 10−3, is able to tackle such adversarial attack, reporting
a surprising precision accompanied by a relatively low level
of uncertainty. It is necessary to perform a more aggressive
and unrealistic adversarial attack with  = 0.1 (bottom-right
image) to fool our framework, which anyhow raises a high
level of uncertainty for this wrong prediction, giving an ulterior
feeling for robustness.
To further testify the robustness of our approach, we show
how assuming an input noise of 0.1 is enough to contrast an
adversarial image generated with adversarial noise  = 0.1.
This remarkable result is shown in Fig. 7, where, for both the
real and the adversarial image, our framework outputs precise
predictions.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work, we proposed a framework that estimates the
total uncertainty by propagating a Gaussian distribution over
input data that is suitable to any existing (possibly-trained)
neural network. To do so, we used a layer-wise approximation
(ADF) that allows to propagate uncertainties through a given
network. By further placing dropout before every weight layer,
it is possible to take into account also model uncertainty. The
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Results – Comparing robustness to attacks
➢ Adversarial attacks evaluation (analyzed images with lowest uncertainty)
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 [𝑟𝑎𝑑2]
MC Dropout Ours
𝜀 = 0.01
𝜀 = 0.1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 10−3
Model Uncertainty Evaluation
GT steer = 0.01047
Model Uncertainty Evaluation
GT steer = -0.01920
Model Uncertainty Evaluation
GT steer = 0.02793
Model Uncertainty Evaluation
GT steer = -0.00056
Image Adversarial Image
Image Adversarial Image
Image Adversarial Image
Image Adversarial Image
Fig. 6. C mparison be ween efficacy of adversarial attacks if applied on
non-Bayesian NN (left) against efficacy of adversarial attacks performed on
our framework (right). An input variance of 10−3 is here assumed.
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Results – Total Un ert i t  noise 0.1 
➢ Robustness to adversarial attacks (analyzed images with lowest uncertainty)
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 [𝑟𝑎𝑑2]
Experiment 
conducted with 
𝜎𝑛 = 0.1
Outside 
input 
variance 
range
𝜀 = 0.1
Total Uncertainty Evaluation
GT steer = -0.13085
Image Adversarial Image
Fig. 7. Efficacy of our framework against strong and unrealistic adversarial
attacks ( = 0.1) for assumed input noise σ2n = 0.1, matching with the
applied adversarial noise.
framework that we derived proved to be robust to adversarial
ttacks and noisy inputs, making an important step towards
safe autonomous driving. A downside of our approach is
precision loss [17] due to mistuned input variance or to
numerical instability reasons, caused by near-zero divisions.
However, when assuming a certain level of input noise, users
can choose their preference between precision in predictions
and robustness to larger noise. Also, it is necessary to perform
MC Dropout to collect multiple stochastic forward samples
from the NN to compute model uncertainty, introducing a
high computational footprint. Nevertheless, according to our
experiments conducted on this task with a GPU Nvidia GTX
1050Ti, we are able to collect at least 20 MC samples,
which has proven to return satisfactory variance estimates.
Finally, our framework works under the assumption that the
full posterior distribution of the neural network is Gaussian,
but it could be multi-modal. This is an approximation that we
need to apply to tackle the intractability of the true posterior
distribution; other approximations could be used though.
For future work, we propose to approximate and propagate
the distribution over network weights in a similar fashion as
ADF does with activation distributions; this approach may
advance a lightweight alternative to the otherwise computa-
tionally expensive MC Dropout.
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